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ABSTRACT
Authentication is a critical security feature for confirming the iden-
tity of a system’s users, typically implemented with help from
frameworks like Spring Security. It is a complex feature which
should be robustly tested at all stages of development. Unit testing
is an effective technique for fine-grained verification of feature
behaviors that is not widely-used to test authentication. Part of
the problem is that resources to help developers unit test security
features are limited. Most security testing guides recommend test
cases in a “black box" or penetration testing perspective. These
resources are not easily applicable to developers writing new unit
tests, or who want a security-focused perspective on coverage.
In this paper, we address these issues by applying a grounded
theory-based approach to identify common (unit) test cases for
token authentication through analysis of 481 JUnit tests exercis-
ing Spring Security-based authentication implementations from 53
open source Java projects. The outcome of this study is a developer-
friendly unit testing guide organized as a catalog of 53 test cases
for token authentication, representing unique combinations of 17
scenarios, 40 conditions, and 30 expected outcomes learned from
the data set in our analysis. We supplement the test guide with
common test smells to avoid. To verify the accuracy and usefulness
of our testing guide, we sought feedback from selected developers,
some of whom authored unit tests in our dataset.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Software and its engineering → Software testing and debug-
ging; Software libraries and repositories; • Security and privacy
→Web application security.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Authentication is a critical security feature for controlling who has
access to the potentially sensitive data or operations of a software
system [12, 42, 51]. When authentication is included in a system’s
security design, it is typically implemented using language-specific
frameworks (e.g. Spring Security, Apache Shiro) rather than built
‘from scratch’ [7]. However, even with a framework, implementing
authentication is complicated because executing typical function-
ality (e.g. submitting a login form) requires multiple components
(e.g. objects) to interact [12, Ch. 5, p. 6]. Further, there is no ‘single
design’ for authentication because several mechanisms (e.g. pass-
word, PIN), types (e.g. token, session), and protocols (e.g. SAML [5],
LDAP [32]) exist, and systems can be designed to handle more than
one configuration. This flexibility is reflected in authentication APIs,
and adds more complexity to implementation.
With complexity comes risk, especially for security features;
broken authentication is second in OWASP’s Top 10 Most Critical
WebApplication Security Risks [48]. Hence, the importance of testing
complex & critical security features is clear. The most common
security testing techniques, penetration and functional testing [31],
are “black-box”: performed on running instances of a system with
no knowledge of the source code. However, there is an established
“white-box” (code available) technique that can be applied much
sooner, before a prototype is even ready: unit testing.
Unfortunately, unit tests are often overlooked for security [9];
traditional definitions [22] imply that unit tests have limited scope.
However, a recent study of JUnit tests by Trautsch et al. [44] found
no difference between the defect-detecting capabilities of unit and
integration tests, traditionally defined as tests of interactions be-
tween modules [22]. This is supported by the Google Test Blog,
which considers unit testing module interactions (‘behaviors’) a
best practice [25], and other groups advocating more focus on au-
tomated software testing for security implementations [8, 9, 49].
Security testing is motivated by risk models, attack patterns, and
use/misuse cases [11, 51, 54]. Respected security testing resources,
such as the OWASP testing guide [27], suggest test cases in this
context from the “black box” testing perspective. This unfortunately
limits their applicability for developers writing unit tests. In prac-
tice, unit test planning decisions are made arbitrarily by developers
based on their own experience & education [37]. To make testing
more objective, decisions on how much to test are often based on
metrics such as coverage [4, 16, 20, 37]. Some security APIs have
packages for unit testing, but documentation focuses on mocking
and test setup [3, 29, 39] without suggesting test cases.
Currently, there is no empirically-grounded work that addresses
this issue by identifying and describing common authentication test
cases from a unit testing perspective: combinations of scenarios,
conditions, and expected outcomes. Such a resource could be used
to guide practitioners towards incorporating security testing earlier
in the development life cycle.
In this paper, we address this with six novel contributions:
❶ we apply classical grounded theory [19] to perform an induc-
tive analysis of unit tests for authentication from open source
projects. We then characterize the authentication scenarios develop-
ers commonly test, based on real test data. During data collection,
we scoped this investigation to token authentication to maintain
a distinction between tests for authentication and session man-
agement security features. Our findings were curated into a ❷
taxonomy of 53 unique test cases, represented as flow diagrams
and unit testing test guide. In addition, the guide is complemented
by a ❸ set of common test smells found in authentication tests
to avoid. We conduct ❹ interviews with two developers who au-
thored tests in our dataset and sought feedback on the guide from
2 other selected practitioners. These took place at the latest stage
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of our study to verify that the empirical findings are useful in prac-
tice. Finally, we provide an online appendix which includes ❺ the
test guide and ❻ a replication package containing our unit test
dataset, grounded theory artifacts, and supplementary reference
data: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3722631
2 METHODOLOGY
A grounded theory (GT) [19] is a systematic inductive method
for conducting qualitative research when little is known about a
phenomenon of interest. This methodology is driven by emergence
of concepts [18, 43]: progressive identification and integration of
concepts from data that lead to discoveries directly supported by
empirical evidence and grounded in the data [43]. Since we do not
know in advance the nature of the test cases (except a high-level
knowledge that they are related to token authentication), our goal
is to allow the data to drive our process of discovering classes of
authentication features that need to be tested (inductive reasoning)
and their corresponding test cases rather than formulating hypothe-
ses at the beginning of the analysis process (deductive reasoning).
In this study we implemented the seven core activities of “classic”
grounded theory: identification of topic of interest, theoretical sam-
pling, data coding (through open, selective and theoretical coding),
constant comparative analysis, memo writing, memo sorting and
write up & literature review [18, 43]. In addition, we interviewed
practitioners to verify and validate the developer-focused testing
guide we developed based on the hypotheses drawn from this study.
2.1 Phenomena of Interest
GT is suitable for investigating broad questions like “what is go-
ing on here?” [43]. Therefore, when following this methodology
researchers are advised not to form specific research questions and
instead define an area of interest (i.e. the phenomena under obser-
vation). For this study, our target phenomena is unit testing of
authentication implementations. We focus on authentication
because it is a common but complex security feature that receives
limited attention in existing unit testing guidelines.
2.1.1 Definitions The following are key terms related to our phe-
nomena of interest, with the definitions applied in this study:
Unit Test: An implementation of a test case, constructed using a
common syntax/framework such as JUnit.
Test Case: A unique combination of a context, action, condition,
and expected outcome, represented in natural language
Context: Pre-conditions and test setup e.g., object initialization
Action: Manipulations of the subject-under-test, e.g. a method call
Condition: A state or event that influences the action, such as a
specific (e.g. null) parameter value passed to a method call
Expected Outcome: The desired state of the subject-under-test
after the action is performed, e.g. specific method call return value
Scenario: A single phrase representation of a unique combination
of context and action
Feature: A label for a set of related test cases
2.2 Data Collection: Mining Repositories
To study our phenomena of interest, we needed access to authen-
tication unit tests from real projects. Therefore, we targeted data
sources that were freely accessible to us. In this context, we focused
on open source projects that implemented authentication and have
corresponding unit tests.
To facilitate the use of an automated approach tomine a large and
rich dataset for our analysis, we set the following narrowing criteria
for language, authentication framework, and testing framework:
the projects must be implemented in Java, use the Spring Security
framework for authentication, and unit tests must be written using
the JUnit framework. Java was selected because it is a popular
choice for back-end development of web applications [23]. The
Spring Security framework is a very popular framework used to
implement authentication in Java, and JUnit is the mainstream
testing framework for Java projects [20, 23].
Data Summary The final data set used for analysis consisted of
481 test methods from 125 unique test files, mined from 53 projects.
These tests were collected using the following procedure:
2.2.1 Data Source We selected GitHub as a repository source.
GHTorrent [21] and the REAPER tool [28] were used to automat-
ically identify, clone, and filter 100,000 randomly selected Java
projects from GitHub. The data set was filtered for empty, dupli-
cate, and inactive (no commits or recent updates) repositories using
metadata from GitHub API: size, commits, and date of last push.
The test ratio metric from REAPER was used to discard projects
with no JUnit tests, leaving 33,090 candidate projects. An automated
script was developed to parse these projects and verify use of Spring
Security, the target authentication framework.
2.2.2 Detecting Use of Spring Security A package-search approach
was used to identify projects that used Spring Security to imple-
ment authentication. To curate a list of relevant packages, we re-
viewed several forms of documentation provided by Spring: an
overview of the framework’s architecture [34], the comprehensive
reference document [1], and the API documentation [40]. First, we
identified objects required to implement authentication such as an
Authentication Provider. These were used as a starting point
to find the root packages providing each component in the API.
Next, we reviewed all root packages in the API documentation to
identify packages for flexible components such as the numerous
authentication mechanisms (e.g. LDAP, SAML) Spring Security can
integrate with. We excluded packages related to sessions to prevent
expanding the phenomena under study to session management,
which we consider a unique security feature. Our final list of 18 root
packages with descriptions has been included in the supplementary
materials for this paper: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3722631
2.2.3 Identifying Relevant JUnit Test Files Included in REAPER’s
repository analysis was a list of JUnit test files for each project.
Our script used these lists and our authentication package list to
automatically search each test file for imports of one or more of
these packages. We addedan additional rule that test files importing
the Security Context Holder or User Details packages should also
import at least one more from the list, because these packages are
also used to implement authorization. We randomly selected 50
resulting test files to ensure there were no false positives. This
search identified 229 test files from 150 projects.
2.2.4 Duplicate Removal A major component GitHub’s contribu-
tion workflow is forking, or making a copy, of a repository. Forks in
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our data set were identified from the GHTorrent metadata. If forks
were discovered, the original repository was kept and all forks were
discarded. Forks containing unique and relevant tests would have
been kept, but this situation did not arise.
We also discovered that several projects in the dataset were
built using the JHipster development platform [47]. This platform
helps developers build highly customizable web applications with a
Spring-based server side. JHipster also provides a test suite for the
code it generates, that includes relevant authentication tests. In our
dataset, we found 81 projects that only included the provided test
file without adding additional related tests to this file or others (as
detected by our tools). There was no reason to include duplicates of
the same test method in our analysis, so we excluded these projects
but included the original file with the authentication test cases from
the JHipster repository.
2.2.5 Identifying Relevant JUnit Test Methods Next, we built an-
other tool that utilized the JavaParser [10] Symbol Solver to identify
individual test methods within these files that used objects from
the imported packages. This AST parser uses the test file and the
source project to identify the package of origin for an object. Our
tool was configured to record all test methods that had at least one
object originating from one of the 18 root packages on our list, with
the additional rule for the Security Context Holder and User Details
packages from test file selection. To verify the automated identifi-
cation (see Section 2.2.3), we performed a manual validation of 50
randomly selected results, and discarded test methods that did not
use packages from our candidate set. Our final dataset contained
481 unique test methods.
2.3 Open Coding & Memoing
Two authors independently performed open coding [18, 43] by anno-
tating the 481 test methods in our data set with organically-derived
codes reflecting concepts and themes present in the test (cf. ① in
Figure 1). Authors reviewed each test method and its setup & helper
methods. Accurately identifying themes and concepts requires thor-
ough understanding of each test method. Prior work in test summa-
rization [55] has shown that test comprehension can be achieved by
identifying a test’s context: precondition(s) & setup; action: manip-
ulation(s) of the subject-under-test; and expected outcome: desired
state and result(s) after performing the action.
We captured these concepts in memos formatted as Gherkin
scenarios [38]. Gherkin is used in behavior-driven development
to capture scenarios in a non-technical & readable format. Test
components are represented using three keywords: Given (context),
When (action), & Then (expected outcome). The And keyword is
used when a components spans multiple statements in a test. When
an existing memo fully represented a new test method, no new
memo was created to avoid duplicate memos. However, the test
was still annotated with codes. We attached the codes as well as
more data in a customMetadata section in each scenario (cf. bottom
block in Listing 2), which is not part of the official Gherkin syntax.
Listing 1 shows a unit test testJWTFilterInvalidtoken() that
verifies whether a request containing an invalid JSON Web token
(JWT) is filtered and no authentication occurs. Also shown are setup
and helper methods from the test class that provide additional
context. Listing 2 shows the test’s corresponding memo in the
Gherkin syntax. The Token-Authentication and Filter-Chain codes
represent core authentication concepts in the test. All memos are
included in the supplementary materials.
public class JWTFilterTest {
private TokenProvider tokenProvider;
private JWTFilter jwtFilter;
@Before
public void setup() {
JHipsterProperties jHipsterProperties = new JHipsterProperties ();
tokenProvider = new TokenProvider(jHipsterProperties);
ReflectionTestUtils.setField(tokenProvider , "secretKey", "test␣secret");
ReflectionTestUtils.setField(tokenProvider , "tokenValidityInMilliseconds",
60000);
jwtFilter = new JWTFilter(tokenProvider);
SecurityContextHolder.getContext ().setAuthentication(null);
}
@Test
public void testJWTFilterInvalidToken () throws Exception {
String jwt = "wrong_jwt";
MockHttpServletRequest request = new MockHttpServletRequest ();
request.addHeader(JWTConfigurer.AUTHORIZATION_HEADER , "Bearer␣" + jwt);
request.setRequestURI("/api/test");
MockHttpServletResponse response = new MockHttpServletResponse ();
MockFilterChain filterChain = new MockFilterChain ();
jwtFilter.doFilter(request , response , filterChain);
assertThat(response.getStatus ()).isEqualTo(HttpStatus.OK.value());
assertThat(SecurityContextHolder.getContext ().getAuthentication ()).isNull ();
}
// ..
}
Listing 1: An example JUnit test from the data set and it’s
corresponding setup & helper methods.
Scenario: JWT Filter Invalid Token
Given A new JHipster Properties Object is initialized
And A Token Provider is initialized with the JHipster Properties Object
And The Token Provider 's secretKey attribute is initialized
And The Token Provider 's tokenValidityInMilliseconds attribute is initialized
And A new JWT Filter is initialized with the Token Provider
And The Security Context 's Authentication Token Object is set to null
And A "wrong" String representation of a token is created
And A new Mock HTTP Servlet Request is initialized and its Authorization
header is set with the wrong String Token
And the Mock HTTP Servlet Request 's Request URI is set
And A new Mock HTTP Servlet Response is initialized
And A new Mock Filter Chain is initialized
When The JWT FIlter 's doFilter method is called with the Mock HTTP Servlet
Request , Mock HTTP Servlet Response , and Mock Filter Chain
Then The Status of the HTTP Servlet Response is 200
And The Security Context 's Authentication property is null
Metadata:
ProjectName: loja
FileName: JWTFilterTest.java
TestName: JWTFilterInvalidToken
Codes: Token-Authentication, Filter-Chain, multiple-assertion
Listing 2: Sample memo & codes for the test in Listing 1.
2.4 Constant Comparative Analysis
In open coding, concepts are organically extracted from the data
rather than assigned from an existing set. Initial codes are often
broad, but additional analysis will reveal more specific patterns and
concepts. To accommodate this in our analysis we incorporated
constant comparative analysis [19] into the open coding process.
Test methods & memos were constantly compared to identify
reoccurring themes and note variations. New codes were constantly
compared against the existing set to merge codes that were too
fine-grained (not enough data points) and refine overly-broad codes.
For example, one initial code was tokens, which are objects used
to store and authenticate user credentials. As more test methods
were reviewed this code was refined into 3 new codes representing
these actions: verify token properties, token authentication, and re-
fresh token. Another initial code, verify user properties was merged
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Scenario: JWT Filter Invalid Token
Given …
When …
Then …
Metadata:
…
Codes: Token-Authentication,
Filter-Chain,
multiple-assertion,...
Testing Guide
Feature: Token Authentication
Scenario: Token passed to 
Authenticating Servlet Filters using 
HTTP Request
Condition: Token is invalid
Expected Outcome: Authentication Fails
Test Smell Analysis
Assertion Roulette
Open Coding & Memoing
Selective Coding
Theoretical Coding
Memo Sorting
token authentication, filter 
chain, multiple-assertion,…
Codes
Authentication fails when an invalid 
token is passed to an authenticating 
servlet filter
Test Casepublic class JWTFilterTest {
private TokenProvider tokenProvider;
private JWTFilter jwtFilter;
@Before
public void setup() { //… }
@Test
void testJWTFilterInvalidToken()
{ //… }
Constant Comparative Analysis
1
2
3
4
JUnit Test File Gherkin Memo
Figure 1: Schematic of the applied four step coding process.
with verify token properties because further analysis revealed that
in all cases, these properties were being retrieved from a token.
2.5 Selective Coding
After all the unit tests were annotated, the authors compared their
codes to review concepts and themes discovered. During this dis-
cussion it was revealed that the author’s codes had different focuses:
one author focused on authentication concepts (e.g. tokens) and the
other focused on properties making tests smelly or unique. After re-
viewing each other’s codes, it was decided that each author would
then conduct selective coding [19] on codes for their respective
theme, conducting deeper analysis to refine the identified concepts
(cf. ② in Figure 1).
2.5.1 Test Cases for Token Authentication For each code, all rele-
vant unit test methods were analyzed in-depth to capture all unique
combinations of test contexts, actions, conditions, & expected out-
comes) associated with the code. Constant comparative analysis
was applied to modify existing codes to incorporate these combina-
tions. For example, verify token properties was refined into four new
codes: input validation during token initialization, pre-authentication
verification of token properties, post-authentication verification of
token properties, and token validation fails with incorrect input.
As selective coding progressed, multiple tests sharing the same
unique combination of these elements were iteratively merged into
natural language test cases. The resulting collection of unique
authentication test cases grouped by code form the basis for the
study’s conclusions about test cases for authentication.
2.5.2 Test Smells Test cases annotated with smell-based codes
were revisited to map these codes to the existing taxonomy of test
smells. A test smell “refers to a symptom in test code that indicates
a deeper problem” [15]. As a starting point for coding and naming
the smells, we reviewed the 3 categories of 15 test smells provided
by Meszaros [26]. A more detailed taxonomy from a literature
review conducted by Garousi et al. [15] ultimately served as the
reference used to define and identify occurrences of known test
smells. However, during the selective coding we intentionally did
not limit the search for these known test smells in order to identify
new smells and also cover saliences we noticed. The smells we
found are discussed in detail in Section 4.
2.6 Memo Sorting
During the selective coding phase, the memos related to authenti-
cation concepts were merged to form natural language test cases.
These and the test smell memos were then sorted by concept to
relate test cases to corresponding smells (cf. ③ in Figure 1).
2.7 Theoretical Coding
In the open coding phase, authentication testing concepts were
discovered and represented as codes, and memos were created to
summarize unit tests. Selective coding was then performed to deter-
mine the scope and magnitude of each code, resulting in a detailed
report of test smells and an organized collection of generalized
token authentication test cases. Next, theoretical coding [19] was
performed to connect related codes and construct a taxonomy of
token authentication unit tests (cf. ④ in Figure 1). This would be
used to construct the token authentication unit testing guide.
2.7.1 Test Cases for Token Authentication During theoretical cod-
ing, we integrated and structured our concepts using a hierarchical
coding paradigm. High-level authentication concepts were struc-
tures into features such as TokenManipulation and Login. Concepts
reflecting unique combinations of context and action related to each
feature were structured as scenarios. For example, the Token Au-
thentication feature has four scenarios: token passed to authenticator,
token passed to authenticating servlet filter via HTTP request, ap-
plication supports multiple authentication types, and authentication
succeeds. In this paradigm, test cases within a feature can share a
scenario and an expected outcome, but have a unique condition. For
instance, 4 test cases in the token passed to authenticator scenario
have the expected outcome authentication fails. However, there are
four unique conditions that should cause this outcome: (1) the token
value is empty, (2) the token is expired, (3) one or more user details
are missing, and (4) one or more user details are incorrect. Each
condition could cause a failure or defect if not handled correctly,
and all should be verified.This hierarchy was adapted from the
concept of equivalence class partitions used in test planning [6, 30].
2.7.2 Test Smells In selective coding, smell-based codesweremapped
to known test smells when appropriate. During theoretical coding,
we identified links between the smell concepts and authentication
test concepts. For example, it was found that the obscure test smell
occurred primarily in test cases exercising scenarios for the To-
ken Manipulation feature, specifically verifying correctness of token
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attempts authentication
Authentication fails
Authenticator returns 
Authenticated Token
Authentication proceeds
Token passed to 
authenticating Servlet 
Filter via HTTP 
request
Application supports 
multiple 
authentication types
Authentication 
succeeds
Application handles error 
(e.g. Exception)
No compatible 
Authenticator
Token passed to 
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Authenticated Token’s 
stored User properties 
consistent with initialized 
Token
Security Context 
contains Authenticated 
Token
“is authenticated” 
property of authenticated 
Token is True
Record of authenticated 
users contains user
Token is empty
Request missing header
Token is valid
Request is valid
Token is missing 
1+ user details
Token has 1+ 
incorrect user details
Request missing Token
in header
Request has invalid 
Token in header
Token is expired
Figure 2: Test Cases for the Token Authentication Feature
properties. In Section 4, the identified test smells are described and
links observed from our dataset are discussed.
3 TEST CASES FOR TOKEN
AUTHENTICATION
At the end of the analysis, we identified 53 unique authentication
unit test cases, organized by 5 features & 17 scenarios as described
below. For each feature a flow diagram visualizes the relationships
between the components that make up each test case: a scenario
representing the test’s context and/or action, a condition describing
the state of an object/property under test during or before the action,
and an expected outcome.
3.1 Token Authentication
Figure 2 shows the 4 scenarios and 16 test cases for using tokens to
store and authenticate user credentials. A token stores the user’s
principal (e.g. username) & credentials (e.g. password) during and
after authentication. Test cases for this feature focus on scenarios
that occur during authentication of a token that has already been
initialized with user data.
The first scenario is Token passed to authenticator. Tests for this
scenario ensure that authentication fails when the object responsi-
ble for authenticating is given tokens containing 4 different types of
invalid user data, such as an incorrect password. An additional test
checks the ‘happy path’, where authentication proceeds when the
authenticator is given a token with valid data. The second scenario
is Token passed to authenticating Serlvet Filter via HTTP request.
Test cases for this scenario verify that when a Filter intercepts and
attempts to authenticate incoming HTTP requests, authentication
fails when the request is invalid, such as one without a header
or with an invalid token. Similar to the first scenario, there is an
additional test case ensuring that authentication proceed with a
valid request. Next is the Application supports multiple authentica-
tion types scenario. Many applications support different types of
authentication: Username/Password, OpenID, OAuth 2.0, etc. For
example, consider many websites allow you to login using your
Facebook or Google credentials. The 2 tests for this scenario verify
that when an incompatible authenticator attempts authentication
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Authentication 
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Figure 3: Test Cases for the Token Manipulation Feature
or there is no compatible authenticator, then authentication is not
successful. For example, a JAAS authentication token should not
be successfully authenticated by an OAuth authenticator. The last
scenario is Authentication succeeds. The 3 tests for this scenario
verify the state of the application reflects this: the user should be
recognized as an authenticated user, the Security Context should
contain the authenticated token, and the user’s properties should
be stored there correctly.
3.2 Token Manipulation
Figure 3 shows the 5 scenarios and 15 test cases related to ma-
nipulating tokens used for authentication. This a distinct feature
from Token Authentication that focuses on the state of the token
and it’s stored properties before and after authentication occurs.
Applications should be tested to make sure they handle token cre-
ation, access, and validation scenarios with correct and incorrect
inputs. The first scenario for this feature is Token initialized with
user details. The 3 tests for this scenario check that initialization
fails when one or more of these user details (such as username
or password) are missing or incorrect, and proceeds when valid
details are provided. Next is Initialization successful: the test for this
scenario ensures that the user data stored in the newly-initialized
token are consistent with the provided values when retrieved. Once
the token has been created, but before authenticating, the user data
properties stored in the token should be checked to ensure it was
stored correctly and can be retrieved. These properties should also
be verified after Successful authentication: this scenario is distinct
from it’s companion in the token authentication feature because
this test case evaluates consistency of the authenticated token’s
user data before it is stored in the application’s Security Context,
which stores all active security information. The fourth scenario
is Token retrieval attempted from storage mechanism. For authen-
tication implementations with storage mechanisms (e.g. OAuth
2.0), token retrieval should be tested to ensure that the application
validates inputs for token requests. Two test cases for this scenario
check that no token is returned for requests with invalid user data
or for non-existent tokens. A third test ensures that the application
raises an exception for the non-existent case. Finally, a token should
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Refresh Token 
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Refresh Token matches 
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expiration date 
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to Client was retrieved 
from Token Store by 
providing Access Token
Refresh Token not 
returned
Application handles the 
error (e.g. Exception)
Refresh Token returned
Figure 4: Test Cases for the Refresh Tokens Feature
be returned when valid user details are provided in a request for
an existing token. The fifth scenario is Token passed to validator
containing five tests; validation should fail when an invalid (null,
empty, unsupported, or partially provided) token is given to the
validator, and proceed for a valid token.
3.3 Refresh Token
Figure 4 shows the 2 scenarios and 10 test cases related to Refresh to-
kens, which are specific to OAuth 2.0 authentication. These tokens
are renewals of an original “access" token. This approach enables
tokens to have short expiry dates, and generating new tokens does
not require frequent re-authenticating. Applications supporting
this refresh tokens should be tested to ensure that the properties of
new tokens are consistent with the original token and creation/ac-
cess behaviors only succeed with valid inputs. The first scenario
is Refresh token requested. Two test cases for this scenario ensure
that a token is not returned when the Client ID is incorrect or (for
applications using the OpenID Connect refresh request mechanism)
the “offline access scope” parameter is not included in the access
token’s initialization. Another test checks that when request pa-
rameters are correct and the client is configured to allow refresh
tokens, a refresh token is returned. 5 tests verify that when the
client receives the requested refresh token (from a server or Token
Store), the user properties are consistent with those in the original
token, the new expiry date is correct, and the token ID is correct.
3.4 Login
Figure 5 shows the 3 scenarios and 7 test cases for the Login fea-
ture. Login behavior should be tested to ensure that the application
appropriately responds to successful & unsuccessful login form
submissions and unconventional request behaviors. The first sce-
nario, Login request initiated is related to form submission and its 3
test cases ensure that users are directed to the requested resource
if login is successful and unsuccessful login results in the user be-
ing denied access and (re-)prompted to authenticate. The second
scenario is User directly requests access to the protected resource. For
example, consider an attempt to navigate directly to your personal
Facebook page instead of the homepage. The 3 tests for this scenario
ensure than an authenticated user is granted access and (similar to
failed login) unauthenticated users are denied access and prompted
to authenticate. Finally, if Multiple login requests are received for
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User directly 
requests access to 
protected resource
Login request 
successful
Login request 
unsuccessful
Login successful 
on first request 
User is currently 
authenticated
User is unauthenticated
User is directed to 
requested resource
User is not directed to 
requested resource 
Record of authenticated 
users only added user 
once
User is prompted to 
authenticate
Figure 5: Test Cases for the Login Feature
Lo
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ut
Scenarios Expected OutcomesConditions
Logout triggered by 
user
User currently 
logged in
Logout is complete
User is redirected
Redirection target is 
designed for 
unauthenticated access 
(e.g. login screen)
User’s credentials are 
no longer valid
User is no longer 
authenticated
Logout is triggered by 
application
Security Context’s 
Authentication Token 
property is null
User’s Token is invalid
Figure 6: Test Cases for the Logout Feature
the same user (e.g. repeated clicks of the ‘submit’ button), the appli-
cation’s record of authenticated users should not have a duplicate
entry for the user.
3.5 Logout
Figure 6 shows the 3 scenarios and 4 test cases for Logout, the
complement to the Login feature. Logout behavior should be tested
to ensure that the application state is updated and the User is
redirected appropriately. The first scenario is Logout triggered by
user (e.g. hitting the ‘logout’ button) and 1 test case ensures that
the user is redirected to a designated location that is ‘safe’ for
unauthenticated users, such as a login screen. The second test case
is for the User is currently logged in scenario. Applications should be
expected to automatically trigger a logout if the user’s credentials
are no longer valid. For example, if you change your Facebook
password on a computer, you should be automatically logged out
of the mobile app until you re-authenticate with the new password.
The last scenario, Logout complete has 2 tests that check applica-
tion state: the user’s token should now be invalid and the Security
Context should have a null authentication token.
3.6 Discussion
A majority of the identified authentication scenarios in the unit
testing guide are concerned with tokens and user credentials. We
believe the prevalence of these tests is due to the design of the
Spring Security API, which provides interfaces for many classes
used for the creation and retrieval of user details (e.g. username,
password) or token manipulation with OAuth2. Framework users
are required to implement application-specific methods for these
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interfaces, resulting in themany scenarios from the dataset focusing
on these properties.
4 ANALYSIS OF TEST SMELLS
Despite plentiful guidelines for developers on how to write high-
quality test code, best practices are not always followed in practice
resulting in symptoms called test smells [17]. Contrasting test bugs
(faults) in test code that change the intended (expected) behavior,
test smells are issues that lower the quality of the test, including
low fault detection power [46]. In the context of authentication
testing, this poses a potential security threat. This section gives an
overview of the test smells we found in the dataset. Due to space lim-
itation, code examples for the smells are available in supplementary
material: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3722631
4.1 Well-Known Test Smells
In this section we summarize 6 test smells [15, 26] that were repeat-
edly observed in our dataset and when applicable discuss smells
that occurred most often in tests for specific features & scenarios.
Obscure Test This smell describes difficulties with test compre-
hension [26, 41]. It commonly stems from an “eager" implementa-
tion, where the test verifies too much functionality. For example,
instead of providing dedicated test cases, the developers decided to
combine similar behaviors (“piggyback”) into one long (“the giant”)
test case. This results in higher maintenance costs, difficulties in
understanding the test, and precludes achieving the goal to use
tests as documentation. It also may hide many more errors, because
during test execution, the first failed assertion aborts the test case.
In our dataset, we observed many obscure tests for the Token
Authentication feature (cf. Section 3.1). Particularly, the same test
case may try to authenticate as anonymous user, as guest user, as
administrator and as user with a disabled account. This all happens
in sequence instead of writing dedicated test cases for each user type.
In the geoserver project, we found overly long test cases spanning
> 100 lines of code, making the test case hard to understand as
a whole. In fact, the developers even placed comments in the test
cases to explain what is being tested indicating the developers found
the code difficult to understand. However to fix the smell, the test
case needs to be restructured and not just commented.
Conditional Test Logic The test case contains code that may
or may not be executed [24, 26]. For example, we observed several
instances of this smell in tests for the Token passed to authenticating
servlet filter via HTTP request scenario. For example, some tests
traversed different configurations in a loop, so the action performed
during the test was dependent on the current configuration. This
smell complicates reasoning about the actual authentication code
and the path taken during test execution; which branch was taken
or which iteration failed.
Test Code Duplication In this smell, the same test code is re-
peated many times [26]. Duplicated code impacts test code main-
tenance [20], which can be a serious issue: if test logic in on code
fragments is modified, all duplicates must be identified & modified
as well. We observed two manifestations of this: either whole test
cases were duplicated (with slight modifications), or code chunks
within a test case were repeated. We found this smell mostly in test
cases for authentication protocols, e.g. SAML or OAuth. Instead of
parameterizing the test cases, the whole test case is duplicated with
minor changes, e.g. testing OAuth with different identity providers
like Google or Facebook.
Assertion Roulette In test cases affected by this smell, it is hard
to tell which of several assertions failed [26]. This smell, also called
the “free ride" [2], is related to the Obscure Test smell and Listing 1
shows an example. When this test fails during test execution, it is
not obvious to tell which assertion failed. Although the number of
assertions in Listing 1 is low, the test case is still considered smelly
because of missing assertion messages. This smell was commonly
found in tests for the Token Authentication and Manipulation fea-
tures. A single test would have assertions for multiple user types
credentials such as unknown user, normal user, and administrator.
Another example is one test for multiple user detail conditions such
as different kinds of invalid passwords.
Excessive Mocking This smell, also known as “mock happy”
refers to a test case which requires many mocks to run [35, 45].
The system under test may need a complex environment, specific
resources, or depend on 3rd party systems which cannot be pro-
vided during test execution. Running tests against a database is a
canonical example. If the database isn’t available, all tests will fail
even though the system under test might be completely bug-free.
A common solution is to mock those potential failures by mimick-
ing the behavior of real objects. Developers also use mocks when
testing authentication, but sometimes struggle with strategy. For
example, in StackOverflow question “Spring Test & Security: How
to mock authentication?”1 the user wants to write unit tests to
verify that URLs of the developed web service are properly secured.
Spring Security has a built-in solution for using mocks in tests,
which was also picked as answer for the referenced question. How-
ever, these built-in solutions were rarely applied in our dataset;
instead developers came up with individual ones leveraging 3rd
party mocking frameworks. Further, in some test cases the amount
of mocked objects and behaviors is overwhelming, and it is hard
to understand what is actually “real” and being tested. The many
mocks indicate many dependencies, making the test fragile and
resistant to change.
Issues inExceptionHandlingThis “silent catcher” smell refers
to a test case that succeeds even when an exception is thrown [15].
Mostly, the exception is ignored along with its type, which repre-
sents specific semantics. This may lead to false results, e.g. when
testing the authentication protocol. For example, consider a test
whose intended behavior is to checkwhether an exception is thrown
when invalid credentials are provided. Without detailed handling
of the exception, the test passes even if the exception that actu-
ally occurs is one that the developer did not expect, such as if the
database storing the users is not available.
4.2 Novel Test Smells
While analyzing the test cases for smells we also noticed interesting
tests containing previously unreported test smells.
Testing theAuthentication Framework In project LuckyPets,
we found a test case that validates the correct behavior of the SHA-1
cryptographic hash implementation provided by the Spring frame-
work. The test literally compares the generated message digest with
1https://bit.ly/2ZLFV4U
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a string constant to see if both are identical. Since the hash imple-
mentation is part of a 3rd party library, the library maintainers are
responsible to properly test the code and not the developer.
Mocking aMocking Framework Similarly, we found multiple
occurrences where test cases tested the applied mocking frame-
work. There, the test author assembles a specific object, e.g. a user,
and instructs the mock library to return this object when the func-
tion under test is called. After performing this call, it is asserted
whether the returned object is identical to the one the mock library
was instructed to return. Thus the correct behavior of the mock
framework is tested and not that of the function.
4.3 Discussion
The above smells are not specific to authentication testing. However,
some smells occurred more often in tests for specific authentication
components.
The obscure test smells was often found when testing user cre-
dentials. There, a few long complex test cases test different creden-
tials combinations such as default user and password, no password,
admin user, disabled user, and of course a successful login. As a
result, a failing test case does not directly provide feedback which
credential combination failed. Spring Security uses filter chains
to intercept requests, detect (absences of) authentication, redirect
to authentication entry points, and eventually let the request hit
the servlet or abort with a security exception. Similarly to user
credentials, different setups, i.e. types and orderings, of filter chains
are often tested in the same test case and thus render it obscure.
In the unit tests for OAuth, we often observed test code duplica-
tion. In the respective code, only the specific endpoint changes, e.g.
Google or Facebook as identity providers. Duplicating code instead
of parameterizing tests increases the maintenance costs.
When testing authentication responses, a common smell we
found is conditional test logic. Loops and if/else chains are utilized
to generate multiple authentication requests and test the responses
(see Sections 3.4 and 3.5). This approach exhibits the conditional
logic smell, which hides the actual code paths taken during test
executions. A cleaner solution would be to implement separate test
cases with linear code paths. However, testing responses usually
involves mocking, such as the requests and the utilized filter chain.
In this respect, we also noticed the excessive mocking smell, where
a multitude of objects are mocked. Once all these mock objects are
created in the test case, they are used multiple times presumably to
avoid code duplication. The same solution could also be achieved
by refactoring the common mock assembly steps in setup routines
which are called at the start of individual test cases.
5 PRACTITIONER PERSPECTIVES
To evaluate the usefulness and accuracy of the testing guide, we
sought feedback from practitioners. We corresponded with 4 prac-
titioners from two different groups: unit test authors, who wrote
unit tests we analyzed in this study and external practitioners, who
did not contribute to our data set but have experience with imple-
menting authentication in Java.
Table 1: Unit Test Authors Interviewed
Test Background Experience
Author
A-1 Senior Developer,
Co-Founder of
Major OSS Project
20 years developing and testing Java
inc. Spring, about 5 years using
Spring Security
A-2 Software Devel-
oper
18 years of Java development & unit
testing, little authentication
5.1 Unit Test Authors
We identified 11 authors of select test files in our dataset from
different projects and reached out to them for a remote interview.
Two developers agreed to participate, each a senior developer but
with different experience with implementing authentication in Java
(see Table 1). The goal of these interviews was to discuss their
rationale when writing the tests, their general testing strategy, and
perspectives on unit testing for security features.
5.1.1 Leading Interview Questions We developed 5 questions to
guide discussion but allow open-ended responses from participants:
Q1: Could you describe your technical background? This question
established the experience of the practitioner. Follow-up questions
were asked when needed to determine experience with Java, im-
plementing authentication, and unit testing.
Q2: How would you describe your involvement in writing and testing
authentication in this project? We encouraged the developers to
discuss the analyzed test cases along with any other authentication-
related contributions they made.
Q3: How did/do you determine which test cases to write? This ques-
tion tells us if they used a metric (e.g. coverage), test guides, or
other resources when planning test cases.
Q4:Would a unit testing guide for authentication would be helpful?
After asking this question, we asked them if they thought select test
cases from our guide, related to the scenarios they tested, would
have been useful to them when writing the tests.
5.1.2 Results Each developer’s background and experience (Q1)
are summarized in Table 1. Regarding Q2, Developer A-1 wrote
many of their project’s initial authentication unit tests. These tests
are actually part of the project itself, so they become part of the test
suite of any application that uses it. Developer A-1 no longer works
on authentication, but their related unit tests remain in use, mostly
unchanged except versioning updates. Developer A-2 had 18 years
of Java experience but limited experience implementing/testing
application security features. About Q2 he mentioned:
“Q2: Every now and then, in my job the security related
features [such as] Kerberos, Authentication encryption,
and etc.) come on but I’m not an expert in them. Some-
one has to implement and test them.”
When asked how they decided what unit tests to write, A-1 said:
“Q3: We start our testing effort by increasing coverage,
but when we got many users, bugs arrived and then
we added more test. These are mostly tests we didn’t
catch by coverage. Things like Token Provider, JWT filter
(JSON Web Token), and security filter were complex,
they clearly needed test. Those are the type of things
you don’t want to leave untested.”
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Table 2: Practitioner Reviewers
Practitioner Background Experience
P-1 Senior Devel-
oper, Architect,
SE Researcher
13–14 years developing and test-
ing Java applications, 3–4 years
implementing authentication
P-2 Software Devel-
oper
5 years using Java, implemented
authentication about 5 times
In this regard, A-2 mentioned:
“Q3: [I] did not have an authentication-based perspec-
tive, it was much more like getting full coverage”
Finally, when asked if a test guide would have helped them when
they wrote the tests (Q4), A-1 said:
“Q4: This guide is an improvement, there is no other
guide today, so this is definitely useful. Specifying which
test is more suitable for unit test and which one is more
suitable for integration testing is useful. People will mess
this up.”
A-2 said the following statement about usefulness of the guide:
“Q4: At the time, wewanted something that works ASAP,
so in the beginning the guide would have not been help-
ful. However, when we needed to improve our authenti-
cation, such through guide on how to test authentication
would have been useful.”
5.2 External Reviewers
We contacted 4 practitioners (from corporations in North America)
who had not worked on the systems we studied but considered
themselves experienced with implementing authentication in Java.
Two of these developers agreed to review our testing guide and
provide feedback. Table 2 summarizes the background and related
experience for each reviewer.
5.2.1 Feedback Guidelines Correspondence between authors and
the practitioners was conducted through email. The initial corre-
spondence included a brief description of the project adapted from
the abstract of this paper. Upon agreement to participate, each prac-
titioner was sent a PDF copy of the testing guide, which did not
include Figures 2- 6, and the direction that we would “appreciate
[their] honest opinion, based on [their] experiences” of the test guide’s
format (Is the guide easy to understand/read?), contents (Are any
important test cases missing, or are any included test cases invalid/un-
necessary?), and overall usefulness (Would this help you test an
authentication implementation, or evaluate coverage from a security
perspective?). We also encouraged reviewers to include ‘any other
comments’ they might have.
5.2.2 Results Neither practitioner found the guide’s format diffi-
cult to understand, but P-1 suggested to present test cases as “. . .
kind of scenario or a flow . . .” that started with “all possible scenar-
ios”. Based on this feedback, we included Figures 2- 6 in the final
version of the test guide. P-1 also requested “more description and
more details, some terms need to be defined.”, which has been ad-
dressed. P-2 suggested minor changes to the phrasing and grammar
of a few tests cases. Neither practitioner thought any test cases
(contents) were invalid. In fact, P-1 highlighted the guide’s wide
applicability: “I think you covered most of the test cases that come in
my mind regardless what authentication technique is used.” However,
P-1 also suggested a missing test case: for the logout is complete
scenario, the token store should be checked to verify the token was
removed. This was included in the final version of the test guide,
available in our supplementary data package. Both practitioners
agreed that overall, the test guide was useful and helpful. P-1 said
“I would say 70% I find this guide useful”, and reiterated their content
and formatting suggestions.
5.3 Summary of Practitioner Perspectives
Overall, practitioners consider the token authentication unit testing
guide to be useful, and none of the included test cases were marked
as invalid. The guide’s narrow scope and some missing test cases
were the only significant drawbacks brought to our attention. Both
unit test authors, who are on opposite ends of the authentication
experience spectrum, felt the guide was useful. Their main concern
was, in practice, developers plan testing from the coverage perspec-
tive. However, A-2 felt they would benefit from using the guide
for retrospective or later-stage testing. We incorporated most of
the minor formatting suggestions and missing test cases into the
final version of the test guide. The coverage comments suggest the
guide could be applied towards developing a technique to calculate
a security coverage metric, which we will explore in future work.
6 LITERATURE REVIEW
Post-analysis, we conducted a literature review to examine whether
our findings are supported by existing literature or add new ideas
to the knowledge base. We organize the related works into 2 groups:
testing authentication, existing authentication testing resources and
test smells, existing work on smelly test code. The IEEE Explore,
ACM Direct, Springer Link, and ScienceDirect research repositories
were manually searched to find full papers. For the first group the
search terms were combinations of ‘unit test’, ‘test case’ ‘security’,
and ‘authentication’. For the second group, the terms were ‘code
smells’ and ‘test smells’.
6.1 Testing Authentication
Numerous resources exist which focus on security testing [8, 9, 11,
31, 31, 42, 51, 54]. Most notably the Open Web Application Security
Project (OWASP) published a guide [27] describing techniques for
testing web service security issues, and assembled a cheat sheet [33]
focusing on specific security topics including authentication. This
guide contains more test cases than our work, and includes session
management, but the test cases were not applicable from the unit
testing perspective. Additionally, a search of major research publi-
cations revealed no studies examining authentication unit testing.
Therefore, we have extended the existing knowledge base with a
testing guide that explicitly describes token authentication test
cases that can be written as unit tests.
6.2 Test Smells
The term “code smell” was introduced by K. Beck and M. Fowler
and served as motivation for their book about code refactoring [13].
Later researchers specifically looked into smells unique to test
code [50]. These “test smells” refer to any symptoms in test code
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that indicate a deeper problem [15]: poorly designed tests and their
presence may negatively affect test suites and production code
(maintainability and functionality), or reductions in one ormore test
quality criteria. Meszaros [26] presents 15 test smells organized in
three categories: code smells, behaviors smells, and project smells. A
recent literature survey by Garousi and Küçük [15] extracted a large
catalog of published test smells. Additionally, the work describes
negative consequences of the smells and ultimately how to deal
with them. We used this catalog and the one of Meszaros [26] to
identify and name the smells. Developing high-quality test code is
a non-trivial task. To assist developers, many guidelines have been
proposed [15]. Garousi et al. [14, 17] introduced the term Software
TestCode Engineering (STCE), which refers to a set of practices and
methods to systematically develop & maintain high-quality test
code. Thus, we extend the existing body of test smell knowledge by
adding a security perspective, highlighting smells associated with
classes of authentication tests.
7 THREATS TO VALIDITY
We identified potential threats to the validity [53] of our study and
have mitigated them as follows.
Construct Validity. In our study we analyzed test cases to identify
common test cases and test smells for unit testing token authenti-
cation. This was done by manually coding each test method. Here
the threat is whether the resulting codes can be accurately used
for our identification task. To mitigate this threat, we followed the
key principles of grounded theory and consistently reviewed the
process to avoid deviations. Further, the resulting codes were peer
reviewed to ensure consistency.
Internal Validity. The main threat to the internal validity of the
research is the manual analysis of unit test methods. This includes
assigning codes to each test case using grounded theory, and identi-
fying test patterns and test smells; manual analysis can be prone to
bias and errors. The coding task was performed by two researchers
with multi-year experience of the java programming language, and
unit testing. Emerging codes were constantly compared among
existing ones to observe commonalities and differences. Feedback
and interviews with 2 practitioners and 2 authors of tests from
our data set were conducted to evaluate whether our findings are
valuable for industry. The goal was to show the study’s practical
significance and not statistical significance. The practitioners found
the results valuable, and important in practice.
External Validity. For our study, we solely focused on open-source
projects, since those were the only available projects to us that
provided all the necessary information to conduct this study. A
potential threat to external validity arises when we want to gener-
alize our findings to a wider population that includes commercial
developments. While open-source tools primarily focus on auto-
mated unit tests for software quality assurance, the of closed-source
projects applied a combination of automated unit tests and manual
user acceptance tests. To mitigate generalization issues, the findings
extracted from this data are represented in a generic format that is
applicable to other security frameworks. As argued by Wieringa
et.al [52], describing the context of studied cases as we did allows us
to “generalize“ our findings by analogy; i.e., findings may apply to
other security frameworks that provide an API for implementing to-
ken based authentication, token manipulation, refresh tokens, and
user login/logout. To verify that the derived test cases are general-
izable to other Java web security frameworks, documentation was
reviewed for JAAS and Apache Shiro. Only framework-agnostic ob-
jects (e.g. Security Context, Servlet Filter) are identified by name in
test cases. Further, including other languages or frameworks would
have minimal impact on the final results, as token authentication
follows a generic flow [36] and the APIs use language-agnostic
protocols such as OAuth2 (RFC 6749) and OpenID Connect.
8 CONCLUSION
This work analyzed authentication unit testing in Java using the
Spring Security framework. Our semi-automated approach created
a detailed taxonomy of 53 unique test cases as well as common test
smells to avoid. Our source for these recommendations were over
400 JUnit test cases extracted from 53 open source Java projects
from Github. We curated our dataset by automatically mining can-
didate projects and using static analysis to detect JUnit test files
which imported packages related to authentication from the Spring
Security API. Next, we used a grounded theory approach to man-
ually identify concepts in the collected data. This involved a four
stage coding process resulting in the test guide and supplementary
analysis of smells. For each test case, a memo containing context,
action, condition and expected outcome was written. The memos
served as a foundation for creating the test catalog and test smell
analysis. We conducted two interviews with authors of unit tests
from our data set and two other selected practitioners to verify that
these findings are useful. The developers confirmed the importance,
quality, and usefulness of the test guide, and suggested a few test
cases that were not discovered in the data. We supplement this pa-
per by providing the mined dataset of authentication unit test files,
the memos and codes used in analysis, and the complete testing
guide: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3722631. We hope that these
recommendations are used by developers to determine which test
cases to write for their authentication implementations, or ensure
what they’ve written is complete.
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